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Abstract 
This thesis investigates a new motive of going private transactions called tun-
neling, which is the expropriation of minority shareholders, in the Hong Kong 
stock market from 1989-2008. We develop hypotheses to study the cause and 
effect relationship between tunneling and going private transactions. We then 
examine the factors contributing to the negative cumulative abnormal returns 
around the announcement of gong private transactions. Lastly, we analyze the 
characteristics that lead to going private and the bidder's return. In other words, 
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HONG KONG, June 26 (Reuters) - According to Alex Arena, Managing Direc-
tor of Pacific Century Cyberworks (PCCW)^, the controlling shareholder will no 
longer pursue privatization and will be moving onto the development of the cor-
poration's core business. Only several weeks ago, Hong Kong's Court of Appeal 
sided with the Hong Kong Securities and Futures Commission (SFC) and rejected 
the bid by Chairman Richard Li through his Pacific Century Regional Develop-
ments to take the firm private. Li's father Li Ka Shing, the richest tycoon in 
Hong Kong, said that corporations would shut down if the private buyouts were 
not permitted when appropriate. 
This is the first time that the SFC used its power to intervene in these proce-
dures. The Hong Kong media states that it is a good time for corporate gover-
nance in the Hong Kong stock market and suggests that more regulations should 
be implemented to protect minority shareholders. The rejection of the privati-
zation of PCCW allows a case study analysis on the increasingly popular notion 
of minority shareholder benefits. It also raises an interesting question: Does the 
going private transaction serve as the last step to complete the expropriation of 
minority shareholders? 
The transaction of going private has long been regarded as an important tool 
^The largest and most comprehensive communications provider in Hong Kong 
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for reorganizing inefficient corporate sectors. Jensen (1986) argues that the high 
level of debt after taking a company private can force the management to switch 
the free cash flow from value-dissipating investments to debt holders. An increase 
in managerial equity holdings can mitigate agency conflicts between insiders and 
outside investors, and enhance the productivity of the firm. 
Unlike the listed firms in the US stock market, corporate ownership in the 
East Asian stock market is highly concentrated. Corporations are usually con-
trolled through pyramid structures and cross-holding among firms. Voting rights 
are commonly separate from cash flow rights (Claessens, Djankov and Lang, 
2000). In companies with such governance structure, agency costs due to the 
separation of ownership and control are less prevalent. However, pyramid struc-
tures facilitate controlling shareholders to transfer resources away from firms for 
their benefits; this is a behavior called tunneling (Johnson et al., 2000). It means 
transferring assets from the listed company to other corporations under their con-
trol and selling assets, goods, and services to the company through self-dealing 
transactions (Johnson, et al., 2000). 
In this paper, we highlight another important reason behind the decision to go 
private: the expropriation of minority shareholders. We directly examine all the 
going private transactions between the public corporations in Hong Kong market 
and their controlling shareholders from 1989-2008. A total sample of 61 going 
private transactions are collected from Hong Kong Stock Exchange. We also 
derive a comprehensive file of financial and corporate governance characteristics 
of firms going private and remaining public. 
This dataset allows us to make a detailed investigation into the relationship 
between tunneling and going private. Particularly, we aim to answer the following 
questions: Does the expropriation of minority shareholders lead to going private 
transactions? Which firms' characteristics lead to the going private transactions? 
i 
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Thirdly, How does the market react to the going private transactions? 
The Hong Kong market is an appropriate setting to conduct this research 
for three reasons. First, Claessens, Djankov, and Lang (2000) and Cheung et 
al. (2006) report that corporations in the Hong Kong market are usually family-
controlled firms, where the majority of shares are held directly by a handful of 
individuals and their family members. Due to this ownership structure, expropri-
ating the benefits of minority shareholders is prevailing in the Hong Kong stock 
market. Second, the frequency of privatization in Hong Kong is much higher than 
that in the US or the UK market. Chong et al. (2009) documents that more than 
48 percent of listed corporations delist from the Hong Kong stock market through 
going private transactions,^ while less than 6 percent of listed corporations delist 
from the US market (Goktan, Kieschnick, and Moussawi, 2009). This makes 
Hong Kong an ideal place to investigate the correlations between tunneling and 
the decision to go private. 
Our evidence suggests that a company with a relatively larger amount of free 
cash flow than other companies in the same industry with a similar size is more 
likely to suffer from tunneling. Tunneling is suspected to happen when related 
party transactions occur between the company and related parties. After ex-
propriating the minority shareholders, the expropriated company will go private, 
and the initiator of the going private proposal benefits from the tunneling. In-
vestors react by selling shares of the expropriated companies, and buying shares 
of companies that benefited from the tunneling. The cumulative abnormal return 
of these two types of companies is negative and positive, respectively. Thus, the 
amount of free cash flow is a determinant of going private decisions. 
The thesis is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the literature and 
develops our hypotheses. We introduce our dataset and present the summary 
2prom 1986 to 2001, 48.32 percent of the delisted firms in Hong Kong are due to privatization, 
29.21 percent due to M&A, and 22.47 percent due to bankruptcy. 
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statistics of the going private transactions and tunneling in the Hong Kong stock 
market in Section 3. Section 4 presents the multivariate analysis on the decision 
to go private and the determination of market premium. Section 5 summaries 
and concludes this paper. 
^ 
Chapter 2 
Literature review and hypothesis 
development 
2.1 Going private 
A more rigorous definition of going private transaction is the exchange of cash 
for the shares of a company ,s existing public shareholders so that, at the end of 
the transaction, the company 's shareholder base has been sufficiently reduced to 
permit the company to elect to terminate its public company status} Given the 
fact that privatization is a human resource and a time- and money-consuming 
activity, it must generate substantial benefits to induce the decision makers to 
do so. 
Deangelo, Deangelo, and Rice (1984) propose a number of benefits of going 
private, such as savings from stockholders' servicing cost; productive gains from 
management buyout as the managerial rewards depend on the performance of 
the company; better monitoring by leveraged buyout specialists than by sparse 
minority shareholders; reduction of marginal agency cost of debt financing be-
cause leveraged buyout specialists have long-term relationships with institutional 
lenders; and the increment of debt can generate a larger corporate tax shield. 
i，，Going private and Going Dark" session of Foley & Lardner LLP's fourth annual meeting 
of National Directors Institute (NDI) 
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These benefits are examined and quantified by later researchers. 
Deangelo, Deangelo, and Rice (1984) provide examples to quantify the sig-
nificant savings gained from the termination of public ownership. Kaplan (1989) 
finds that tax shield from management buyout generates wealth for the company. 
The source of tax benefit of management buyout comes from the increment of 
debt level, which leads to interest deductions. Depreciation deduction from as-
set step-up, a measure that records the asset value as the present value of the 
asset instead of the original price, and Employee Stock Ownership Plan (ESOP) 
are not the main sources of reduction in tax.^ Adopting unsuccessful manage-
ment buyouts as sample, Ofek (1994) justifies organizational change hypothesis in 
management buyouts and disproves private information hypothesis. Companies 
delisted from the public equity market experience better performance because of 
organizational changes, improving the efficiency of business operations. If the 
private information hypothesis is true, cancellation of buyout is still followed by 
improved company performance. In fact, this scene is not realized. Thus, private 
information hypothesis is proven to be wrong. 
With regard to the benefit gained from better monitoring through leverage 
buyout in privatization, the free cash flow hypothesis is conceived to be the 
rationale for companies that go private and enjoy such merit. Jensen (1986) 
proposes that companies with ample free cash flow^ and low growth prospects 
have high agency cost because minority shareholders are not capable of urging the 
management to disgorge free cash flow rather than invest them in negative net 
present value projects that are harmful to a company. He suggests that leveraged 
buyout (LBO), which increases the debt level, can improve the performance of 
companies with ample free cash flow; this idea is known as control hypothesis. 
^Kaplan (1989) provides a footnote to explain the mechanism of ESOP. 
^Free cash flow is the remaining amount of capital after investing in all positive net present 
value projects. 
i 
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The management becomes the residual claimant of the company, and thus it is 
most likely to be efficient in repaying debt and securing its subordinated claim. 
Lehn and Poulsen (1989) justify free cash flow hypothesis as the determinant 
of going private transactions. Their empirical work concludes that privatized 
companies have higher ratio of undistributed cash flow to equity value, lower 
growth rate of sales, and lower management equity ownership than companies 
in the same industry that remain public. Opler and Titman (1993)'s empirical 
analysis confirms free cash flow hypothesis as a crucial determinant of LBOs. 
Moreover, they also suggested that financial distress cost is a vital determinant 
of LBO. The reason is that high financial distress cost discourages LBO, which 
enjoys substantial benefit from privatization through financing by debt. 
In the late 1990's, empirical justification on free cash flow hypothesis came un-
der fire. Kieschnick (1998) pinpoint the deficiency of Lehn and Poulsen's (1989) 
work from the viewpoint of statistical inference. This article reexamines the 
same dataset using a more precise statistical methodology and yields completely 
different results. Halpern, Kieschnick, and Rotenberg (1999) introduce the het-
erogeneity hypothesis to explain the contradicting results in the empirical analysis 
of the free cash flow hypothesis. Researchers often treat all LBOs as homogenous 
in nature. However, poorly performing LBOs can be classified into two types: 
LBOs with high management equity level and those with low management equity 
level. Moreover, the free cash flow hypothesis only considers low management eq-
uity ownership firms. Therefore, previous studies contradict each other because 
their sample incorporates not only low management equity LBOs but also high 
management equity LBOs. 
Recent studies look for determinants of going private from the attributes 
of companies. Bharath and Dittmar (2008) show the diminished advantage of 
becoming a public company set off by privatization. The change in status is a 
t 
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reaction to the surroundings. Using the new methodology, the authors conclude 
that companies with less analyst coverage, less share turnover, less institutional 
share holdings, more concentrated ownership, more mutual fund ownership, and 
being more illiquid in the public market tend to go private. Their findings are 
also in favour of the positive relationship between the amount of free cash flow 
and the odds of going private because these companies do not require much 
public financing. Moreover, higher financial distress cost discourages companies 
with high R & D investment from going private.^ The study contributes to 
the literature by examining the effect of market sentiment on the going private 
decision. Companies tend to go private when there is a boom in the debt market. 
According to Mehran and Peristiani (2009), the notion of financial visibility is 
a crucial determinant of going private. Scarce attention from financial analysts 
reduces price volatility and stock turnover; thus, companies find it more difficult 
to raise funds. This is due to the smaller scale of the financial market in recent 
years. Yet, financial visibility is not an important factor affecting the going 
private decision in 1980's. The free cash flow hypothesis is also considered a 
determinant of the decision to go private. 
Shareholders are compensated by an increase in stock price called premium 
when a company goes private. The increment in stock price is the capitalized gain 
of a company after the change in status. The source of the premium has been 
investigated by a number of articles. Deangelo, Deangelo, and Rice (1984) pro-
pose that minority shareholders should obtain gains from going private because 
they can refuse to sell shares to hinder the going private transaction. By offering 
minority shareholders some benefits, the going private transaction is easier to 
complete. The premium of share price is determined around the announcement 
date. Kaplan (1989) estimated the premium of stock price between the upper 
^See Opler and Titman (1993) for details. 
； 
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bound of 143 percent and the lower bound of 21 percent by combining interest 
deduction from debt and asset step-up. 
Lehn and Poulsen (1989) identify larger free cash flow and lower management 
equity level to be associated with higher going private premium. The reason 
is that management team disgorges free cash flow to raise the premium rather 
than invest them in value-dissipating projects. The agency problem from the 
low management equity level can also be solved through going private transac-
tions as more efficient organization is expected. Better firm performance after 
going private raises the going private premium. These results conform to the 
free cash flow hypothesis. Kieschnick (1998) also criticizes the adoption of the 
ratio of companies' free cash flow to the market value of the companies' equity 
in analyzing the premium. The ratio that represents free cash flow can be disen-
tangled. Kieschnick (1998) proposes the market value of equity to be negatively 
related to the premium and the predicted tax reduction to be positively related 
to the premium. The announcement premium has been is replaced by the final 
premium ^ in Halpern, Kieschnick, and Rotenberg (1999). Both high and low 
managerial equities and poor prior stock performance are positively related to 
the premium. The authors also claim that heterogeneity hypothesis yields better 
prediction than the free cash flow hypothesis. 
2.2 Tunneling and the expropriation of minority 
shareholders 
The theoretical framework of the structure of corporate ownership by Demsetz 
and Lehn (1985) identifies the downside of large shareholding ownership structure 
as expropriating minority shareholders by consuming amenities. The methods 
^Final premium is defined as the difference between the price from one week prior to the 
first announcement of takeover interest and the final trade price. See Halpern, Kieschnick, and 
Rotenberg (1999) for details. 
^ 
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and forms used to exploit minority shareholders are numerous, but there is no 
doubt that large shareholders benefit from such action. 
Tunneling refers to assets being extracted out from a company through an 
underground tunnel. According to Johnson, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and 
Shleifer (2000), tunneling "describes the transfer of assets and profit out of firms 
for the benefit of those who control them." This article focuses on the expropri-
ation of minority shareholders in the form of tunneling. The empirical work by 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) mentions that the existence of large investors leads 
to the expropriation of minority shareholders especially in countries with less 
protection for minority shareholders. Further evidence is found in a database 
featuring 5-10 of the largest companies in 27 countries around the world. Using 
this database, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Visnny (1998) conclude 
that countries with a concentration of ownership of shares are correlated with 
weak governance in the protection of minority shareholders. 
Ownership structure with large shareholders is suggested to be accompanied 
with more severe expropriations. An article from La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and 
Shleifer (1999) summarize the corporate ownership structure around the world. 
They show that large and medium companies with a large shareholder ownership 
structure, which is defined as controlling 10-20 percent of shares of a company, 
prevail in their sample, and the proportion of large shareholding is high relative 
to developed countries. Claessens, Djankov, and Lang (2000) supplement the 
analysis on the separation of ownership and control in East Asian corporations. 
The pyramid structure and cross-holdings are adopted by the controlling share-
holders in the sample of nine East Asian countries. Their work shows that large 
shareholders in corporations prevail in East Asian countries. 
Johnson et al. (2000) illustrate cases on the litigation of tunneling in devel-
oped countries by focusing on self-dealing transactions. Corporate directors are 
i 
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required to abide by the duty of care and fiduciary duty to operations of the 
company. The violation of responsibilities imposed by the law, which includes 
maximizing the profit of the company and protecting minority shareholders from 
expropriations, bring directors to litigation. However, the authors point out that 
much of tunneling is legal in certain circumstances. The difference in applica-
tion of law principles aggravates the expropriation of minority shareholders in 
civil-law countries. 
Bertrand, Mehta, and Mullainathan (2002) study tunneling behaviour in In-
dian business groups. These business groups are controlled by a single family 
or a single shareholder. The author's approach to identify tunneling is to study 
the sensitivity of stock price of firms in business groups to news related to their 
industry. They suggest that firms owned by business groups with low-cash-flow 
rights will be less sensitive to shocks than high-cash-flow firms because profit will 
be diverted to high-cash-flow firms. Low-cash-flow firms will be less sensitive to 
shocks affecting other group firms. Group firms will be especially sensitive to 
shocks on low-cash-flow firms. Lastly, group firms are less sensitive to indus-
try shocks than non-group firms because group firms are expected to perform 
tunneling to transfer profit. 
Bae, Kang, and Kim (2002) apply another method of examining tunneling 
behaviour in Korean chaebols. By studying the announcement return from ac-
quisitions by Korean business groups, the authors reveal that acquisitions increase 
controlling shareholders' wealth by benefiting other group firms but not by adding 
value to the bidder. Based on the empirical evidence, they find that negative cu-
mulative abnormal return is associated with the acquisition by the bidder; thus, 
minority shareholders are expropriated. Evidence also suggests that other firms 
in the chaebol benefit from the acquisition. 
Cheung, Ranand, and Stouraitis (2006) study tunneling behaviour in the Hong 
i 
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Kong stock market. Their analysis focuses on connected party transactions be-
tween listed companies and their controlling shareholders. Different types of 
connected party transactions are identified, and their effects on cumulative ab-
normal return are quantified. According to their study, tunneling behaviour is 
detrimental to the shareholders' value of a listed company because the cumula-
tive abnormal return is negatively significant. The authors also point out the 
characteristics of firms, which are more likely to be subjected to expropriation of 
minority shareholders. 
2.3 Our hypotheses 
We suggest that the going private transaction in Hong Kong is a way of expro-
priating minority shareholders in the form of tunneling, which extracts valuable 
resources or assets from a company. When a company is expropriated by the 
largest shareholder, the stock prices decrease. The tunneling behaviour reduces 
the value of a firm, allowing the largest shareholders to buy the shares of a com-
pany at a lower price. The cost of privatization decreases because the largest 
shareholders can acquire more shares at a lower price. Through the increases 
in stocks turnover, the stock prices increase. On the day of the going private 
announcement, the stock price will have a rocketing increase because the going 
private premium will be offered by the bidder to share gains with the minority 
shareholders, inducing them to surrender their shares to the bidder. 
Tunneling is a general term that describes the action of transferring resources 
and assets out from a company. There are no specific forms of tunneling and thus 
indirect evidence is required to detect the occurrence of tunneling. We propose 
that ample free cash flow lubricates tunneling, and tunneling behaviour will be 
reflected by a long period of negative cumulative abnormal return prior to the 
going private announcement. We suspect that free cash flow will be extracted 
i 
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to the bidders through related party transactions, allowing bidders to gain from 
tunneling. The stock return will be positive for those bidders. Investors are 
expected to sell the stocks when they observe that companies have relatively more 
free cash flow than other companies in the same industry. Thus, the cumulative 
abnormal return of a stock will be negative. The stock return of the bidders will 
increase as investors observe that the firm value increases from tunneling. The 
cumulative abnormal return will be positive after the announcement of going 
private of the acquired firm. Six hypotheses are developed based on the above 
claim. 
1. The cumulative abnormal return is negative prior to the going private an-
nouncement over a period of time. Following Cheung et al. (2006), the 
negative premium reveals a high probability of tunneling having occurred. 
It is a preliminary evidence of privatization caused by tunneling. 
2. The amount of money in related party transaction is positively related to the 
seriousness of tunneling. Cheung et al. (2006) use connected transactions 
as pieces of evidence to detect if tunneling occurs. Assets and equity are sold 
to connected parties with favorable terms. Trading relationships benefit 
from the connected parties at the expense of the company.^ The larger the 
amount of money in related party transactions，the smaller the cumulative 
abnormal return is. Free cash flow is used in trading transactions with its 
related companies in unfavorable terms, depleting the value of the company. 
Asset selling, equity sales, and joint venture acquisitions in related party 
transactions further push down the cumulative abnormal return. 
3. The amount of free cash flow is positively related to the seriousness of tun-
neling. Jensen (1986) links free cash flow to the agency problem through a 
^Section 3.4，Related party transactions, of chapter 3 will discuss the similarities between 
connected transactions and related party transactions. 
/ 
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separation between ownership and control. As the family-controlled busi-
ness system prevails in Hong Kong, control and ownership are not separated. 
We suspect that the owners can extract free cash flow to other companies 
because the company is under their control. The higher the free cash flow 
amount, the more serious the tunneling is, and the smaller the cumulative 
abnormal return. Investors perceive tunneling as more serious when the 
amount of free cash flow is large, urging them to sell the company's stock. 
4. Free cash flow in going private companies is higher than that in public com-
panies in the same industry with similar size. Going private companies 
have relatively higher free cash flow, and thus they become the target of 
bidders and finally go privatized. 
5. Free cash flow is an important factor that leads to privatization. We pro-
pose that tunneling is the reason why companies go private in Hong Kong, 
whereas an ample amount of free cash flow is the reason for tunneling. 
Thus, free cash flow amount affects the decision to go private. 
6. The bidders’ cumulative abnormal return is positive after the going private 
announcement. From the perspective of investors, the bidder is more valu-
able because tunneling is a value adding process to the bidder. This follows 
Bertrand et. al. (2002), which use bidders' cumulative abnormal return to 
test if tunneling occurs. 
Event study, comparison between going private companies and their control 
group, logit regression, and ordinary least squares (OLS) regression are used to 




3.1 Sample construction 
To test the tunneling hypothesis and find out the determinants of going private 
decision, we collect the data of firms that went private from 1989-2008 in the Hong 
Kong Securities Market. First, we use The Securities Bulletin and The Securities 
Journal^ published by the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong and the annual reports 
and HKExnews of Hong Kong Exchange and Clearing Limited^ to identify the 
companies who made privatization announcements. Second, we cross reference 
the announcement sample with delisting information provided by the Pacific-
Basin Capital Markets (PACAP) database. Third, we drop firms that carry 
incomplete information for analysis. PACAP provides the daily stock price and 
accounting data of the sample of privatized companies' up to 2004 only. The stock 
prices afterwards and the companies with incomplete stock price information 
in the PACAP database are supplemented by the DataStream database. The 
final sample consists of 60 privatized companies (with 61 stocks) whose date 
^The Securities Bulletin was renamed as The Securities Journal starting from the Feb 1990. 
2Stock Exchange of Hong Kong and Hong Kong Exchange and Clearing Limited recorded the 
going private announcement date from 1988 to 1998 and 1999 to 2008，respectively. The Stock 
Exchange of Hong Kong, Hong Kong Futures Exchange Limited, and Hong Kong Securities 
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of announcement of going private, complete stock price information, accounting 
variables and characteristics of the board structure are documented�Our sample 
is listed in Appendix A^ 
3.2 Sample description 
After the going private companies are identified, we examine the distribution of 
going private companies and their equity value throughout our sample period. 
Number of Mean Value of Median Value of Total Value of 
Year going private Equity (million) Equity (million) Equity (million) 
1989 2 35M 3 ^ 7 l ^ 
1990 1 709 709 709 
1991 2 3726 3726 7452 
1992 3 4378 1182 13133 
1993 1 1443 1443 1443 
1994 0 / / / 
1995 9 1080702 463000 9726320 
1996 2 1322 1322 2644 
1997 3 3178 384 9533 
1998 1 2634 2634 2634 
1999 2 561 561 1122 
2000 4 88221 75950 352884 
2001 5 3020 1289 15102 
2002 3 313 256 938 
2003 6 1134 316 6803 
2004 3 1433 1128 4300 
2005 6 742 624 4450 
2006 5 1793 705 8963 
2007 2 2503 2503 5006 
200 8 1 S m 3 m 3167 
Table 3.1: Number, Mean Equity Value, Median Equity Value, and total Equity 
value of Companies that went Private in 1989-2008 
Table 3.1 reports the annual number of firms going private and their mean, 
median, and total equity in each year during the sample period. We find that 
^Appendix A records the announcement dates of going private companies. 
1 
CHAPTER 3. Samples 17 
there is no significant trend in the number of going private companies in each 
year and in the mean, median, and total value of equity. Comparing 1991-2000 
and 2001-2008, we observe that the average number of going private companies 
in the first period is less than that in the second period, although there were nine 
companies that went private in 1995. From 1991-2000, there are 2.7 companies 
that went private per year, whereas from 2001-2008, there are nearly 4 companies 
that went private per year. 
However, the mean, median, and total value of equity in the first period are 
significantly higher than those in the second period. The mean value of equity 
in the first period is 117 billion, whereas that in the second period is 1.76 billion. 
The median value of equity in the first and second periods is 1.44 billion and 
0.91 billion, respectively. The total value of equity in the two periods is 1.01 
trillion and 0.48 billion, respectively. Clearly, the average number of going private 
companies is larger in the second period, but the mean, median, and total value 
of equity are higher in the first period. The huge difference in the mean, median, 
and total value of equity is because of the withdrawal from the listing of four 
subsidiaries of the Jardine Matheson Holdings Limited, including the holding 
company itself.^ Jardine Matheson was established in Hong Kong in 1832. It 
handles different businesses in Hong Kong and has a large market capitalization. 
The uncertainty caused by the return of sovereignty of Hong Kong to China in 
1997 alerted this corporation and facilitated its withdrawal from the Hong Kong 
listing of the Jardine group. 
Table 3.2 presents the items identical to those in Table 3.1. The mean, median, 
and total value of equity are deflated using the GDP deflator.^ The results yield 
^The five companies that went private are Jardine Matheson Holdings Limited, Jardine 
Strategic Holdings Limited, Mandarin Oriental International Limited, Dairy Farm International 
Holdings Limited, and Hong Kong Land Holdings Limited. 
5QDP deflator (or Implicit price deflator of GDP) is obtained from the Hong Kong Census 
and Statistics Department. GDP deflator of 2007 ^ 100 
/ 
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the same conclusion. Thus, inflation does not account for the results based on 
Table 3.1 
Number of Mean Value of Median Value of Total Value of 
Year going private Equity (million) Equity (million) Equity (million) 
~ m 9 2 5 m 5 m 10096 
1990 1 934 934 934 
1991 2 4500 4500 9000 
1992 3 4811 1299 14432 
1993 1 1459 1459 1459 
1994 0 / / / 
1995 9 986042 422445 8874380 
1996 2 1140 1140 2279 
1997 3 2592 313 7776 
1998 1 2133 2133 2133 
1999 2 475 475 951 
2000 4 77591 66799 310364 
2001 5 270 6 1155 13532 
2002 3 291 238 871 
2003 6 1122 313 6729 
2004 3 1470 1157 4410 
2005 6 762 641 4569 
2006 5 1845 725 9221 
2007 2 2503 2503 5006 
200 8 1 3 ^ 3 m 3120 
Table 3.2: Number, Mean Equity Value, Median Equity Value, and total Equity 
value of Companies that went Private in 1989-2008 (real price level 2007=100) 
3.3 Corporate governance and financial variables 
Unlike the corporations listed in western industrial countries, only a small pro-
portion of listed corporations is widely held in Hong Kong (Claessens, et al. 2000; 
La Porta, 1999). Although Hong Kong's capital market is developed by the UK 
in an Anglo-Saxon corporate governance system, it has been incorporated with 
an Asian family-controlled business system. The main shareholders usually take 
i 
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an active position in the corporate operation and also tend to hold both Chief 
Executive Officer (CEO) and board Chairman positions. 
This section introduces three groups of data for our analysis. The control 
variables in our paper include the characteristics of the board of directors, ac-
counting variables, and trading volume. All these variables are obtained from 
various sources. Variables related to the characteristics of the board of directors 
come from the annual reports of the companies selected for our analysis.® The 
PACAP database provides a comprehensive set of accounting variables for all 
companies. 
The number of directors in the board (Number of directors) serves as an indi-
cator to identify whether the board is large or not. To examine the independence 
of the board, the proportion of non-executive and independent directors inside 
the board (Proportion of non-executive and independent directors) is included/ 
The proportion of shares owned by the board of directors (Proportion of directors, 
shareholding) is computed to examine the ownership of the board to determine if 
the board has high cash flow rights. Another dummy variable, audit committee 
(Audit committee), is included to indicate the existence of an audit committee 
participated by the non-executive directors and independent directors. 
The above variables are collected in two sets. The first set includes the infor-
mation of the companies one fiscal year before privatization and the information 
of the matched listed companies for the same fiscal year. The second set collects 
®We record the board characteristics variables from the annual reports of the companies. 
The sources of annual reports are different in different time period. In fiscal years 1987-1995， 
the annual reports come from the microfilm produced by Singtao Enterprise. In the fiscal years 
1996-2000, the annual reports are extracted from CD-ROMS produced by Hong Kong Exchange 
and Clearing Limited. From 2001 onwards, the public companies' annual reports in e-version 
come from HKExnews. 
^Non-executive directors and independent directors generally have the same role in the board 
of directors'. Both supervise the action of the executive directors in operating the company, 
but they have no role in operating the company. They are also not involved in other businesses 
with material interest that conflicts with their independence. The main difference of the two 
types of directors is that non-executive directors receive remuneration from the company. 
1 
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the information of the companies a year before the first set of variables is col-
lected to identify the stability of the structure of the board. These variables are 
Number of directors�. Proportion of non-executive and independent directors—1. 
Proportion of directors，shareholding�and Audit committee�. They have the 
same explanation as the above-mentioned variables but indicate the situation a 
year before the previous one. 
The set of accounting variables that examine the prospects of the company in-
cludes net income over sales [Net income over sales (winsorized)], market-to-book 
ratio [Market to book (winsorized)] and the natural logarithm of asset [ln(Asset)], 
which are commonly used in the literature. The leverage position is reflected in 
the debt to market equity ratio [Debt to market equity (winsorize)].^ Lastly, free 
cash flow over market equity [Free cash flow scale (winsorize)] is calculated to 
examine whether the company has ample cash flow for expropriation. Accord-
ing to Lehn and Poulsen (1989) and Chong et al. (2009), free cash flow equals 
income from operations — income tax + deferred taxation — interest expense — 
cash dividend.9 
Trading volume is also an important determinant of the decision to go private. 
According to Mehran and Peristiani (2009), financial visibility plays a vital role 
in the delisting of US companies. To test if this applies to the Hong Kong 
stock market, a variable [ln(Turnover)]^^^ is constructed to measure the turnover 
rate. The larger the shareholding of the largest shareholder of the going private 
company is, the higher the cumulative abnormal return. The reason is that the 
drop in stock price directly affects the benefit of the largest shareholder. Following 
Cheung et al. (2006), the proportion of shareholding of the largest shareholder 
^Following Bhandari (1988), financial leverage is defined as the ratio of the book value of a 
firm's long-term debts to its common stock's market value. We also used the book leverage as 
an alternative measures. It turns out that our results remain unchanged in either specifications. 
^These accounting variables are winsorized at 2.5 percent to deal with the impact of outlier 
observations. 
^^ln(Tumover) = ln( the sum of 12 months' trading volume / shares outstanding ) 
1 
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is measured as the ratio of the total shareholdings of the largest shareholder 
over the number of outstanding shares [Proportion of shareholding of the Largest 
shareholder]. These shareholdings include shares held in the legal entity's name 
and shares held by corporations and institutions controlled by the legal entity. 
3.4 Related party transactions 
A number of evidence have shown that firms with concentrated ownership can ex-
propriate the benefits of minority shareholders through self-dealing transactions. 
Johnson et al. (2000) suggest that controlling shareholders can extract cash by 
selling assets to the company; they can transfer assets from the listed compa-
nies to corporations under their control; and they can also dilute the interest 
of minority shareholders. Cheung et al. (2006) examine a sample of connected 
transactions of Hong Kong listed corporations and their controlling shareholders, 
and find a substantial excess negative returns when firms announce connected 
transactions. An interesting question is whether the substantial negative excess 
return before going private may be due to the connected transactions. 
In our analysis, we adopt the related party transaction, which is an accounting 
standard. According to the Hong Kong Accounting Standard 24, related party 
transaction is defined as a transfer of resources, services or obligations between 
related parties, regardless of whether a price is charged. Connected transaction, 
which is a legal standard in The Hong Kong Stock Exchange, is not included in 
our analysis for the following reasons. First, connected transactions are available 
from 1997 onwards, but our analysis starts from 1989. There are insufficient con-
nected transactions records for us to examine the expropriation phenomenon in 
our samples. Second, according to the definition of Hong Kong Accounting Stan-
dard 24 and Hong Kong Listing Rules Chapter i4A, the disclosure of connected 
transactions and related party transactions target similar types of transactions. 
^ 
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We collect all the related party transactions from the corporate annual re-
ports. The related party transactions are huge in terms of the amount of money. 
Here we provide an example to determine how related party transactions are 
conducted. In the fiscal years 1996-1997, Chevalier Development International 
Limited, one of our going private sample companies had a related party transac-
tion with the company that become its bidder later on. The transaction involved 
providing electrical and mechanical equipment and building materials amounting 
to HK$43,337,000. Cheung et al. (2006) find that firms announcing connected 
transactions earn significantly negative excessive returns. Our analysis includes 
an indicator to reflect the amount of money involved in the related party trans-
actions. We calculate the amount of money recorded in the related party trans-
actions (Related party transactions). This variable records the total amount of 
money involved in the related party transactions over the total asset one fiscal 




4.1 Event study results 
The effect of the going private announcement on stock performance, which is one 
of the focuses of this paper, will be studied in this section. The announcement 
day is the day when the going private news is first publicly announced. The 
cumulative abnormal return and the daily abnormal return of our sample before 
and after the going private announcement are estimated using the standard event 
study methodology of Brown and Warner (1985).i Figure 4.1 presents the cu-
mulative average abnormal stock returns from 360 days before to 10 days after 
the going private announcement.^ In Figure 4.1, minor fluctuations are evident 
through out the event window: 360 days before the privatization announcement 
and 10 days after it. 
As shown in Figure 4.1, the cumulative average abnormal return steadily de-
creases from the start of the event window to the lowest point at —16.6 percent 
cumulative average abnormal return 75 days before the privatization announce-
ment. The cumulative average abnormal return then slowly climbs up from —74 
to —38 days. Afterwards, the cumulative abnormal return rises astonishingly 
iFor the methodology of event study and the estimation of market model, refer to appendix 
B 
^The result is still robust when we use another day for the start of the event window. The 
end of the event window cannot be changed due to the restriction from the dataset. 
23 
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Figure 4.1: Cumulative average abnormal return from 360 days before to 10 days 
after the privatization announcement of 60 companies between 1988 and 2008 
from —9.9 percent 37 days before the privatization announcement to 20.2 per-
cent 10 days after it. The cumulative average abnormal return reaches a positive 
level two days before the privatization announcement. There is also a significant 
jump from 1.4 percent to 15.4 percent in the cumulative average abnormal return 
from one day before the privatization announcement to one day after. 
The mean of cumulative average abnormal return is —0.088 percent, from 
—360 to —75 days before privatization announcement. The corresponding t-
statistics is —26.24 (p-value=0). The cumulative average abnormal return is neg-
ative throughout the event window is statistically significant. Thus, our results 
suggest that going private firms in Hong Kong experience substantial negative 
premiums prior to going private. We will use these negative premiums as inde-
pendent variables in the test in the next chapter. 
/ 
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We will then take a closer look at the daily average abnormal return in selected 
days and the cumulative average abnormal return in different event windows. The 
daily average abnormal return and the cumulative average abnormal return are 
reported in three groups. The first group is the daily average abnormal return 
of all going private companies. The second and the third groups report the daily 
average abnormal return by splitting our sample into above and below mean 
shareholding.^ 
The mean daily average abnormal return is significant at the 1 percent level, 
and the median is significant at the 5 percent level 30 days before the announce-
ment date for all going private companies. The mean daily average abnormal 
return is significant at the 5 percent level, and the median is significant at the 
10 percent level for going private companies with below mean share holding 30 
days before the announcement date. The mean daily average abnormal return is 
significant at the 10 percent level for going private companies with above mean 
shareholding 30 days before the announcement date. The difference between the 
mean and median of going private companies with above mean shareholding and 
the going private companies with below mean shareholding is also statistically 
insignificant. 
Although most daily average abnormal returns for all going private companies 
are statistically insignificant in Table 4.1, most cumulative average abnormal 
returns for all going private companies are statistically significant in Table 4.2. 
Only the event window [ -1 ,+1] of all going private companies is statistically 
insignificant in the mean and median, while all other event windows are significant 
at the 1 percent level in the mean and median. The cumulative average abnormal 
return is negative in event windows [-360, -75], [—250, -75], [-200, -75], 
^Shareholding is defined as the shareholding proportion of the initiator of the going private 
proposal in the going private company. The mean value of the shareholding proportion is a 
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—180，一75] and [ -90, -75] and is positive in event window [—75, —30], [-30,0], 
- 10 , 0], [ - 1 , +1] (statistically insignificant) and [+l ,+10 . 
We claim that the shareholding proportion of the initiator of the going pri-
vate proposal affects the cumulative abnormal return of the company. The higher 
the shareholding proportion is, the higher the cost of expropriating the company. 
Given the same amount of loss of the company, the stakeholder with higher cash 
flow rights suffers more from the loss of the company. By analogy, higher share-
holding proportion induces a higher cost to the stakeholder who expropriates the 
company. Specifically, the cost is the drop in cumulative abnormal return, and 
the shareholding proportion and the cumulative abnormal return are negatively 
related. The seriousness of expropriation of a company is also inferred from the 
cumulative abnormal return. The seriousness of expropriation and the cumu-
lative abnormal return is inversely related. More serious expropriations should 
come with lower cumulative abnormal returns as the market will react to the 
expropriation of the company by selling its shares. Based on the above claim, 
we divide the cumulative abnormal return of our sample companies into above 
or below mean shareholding. 
For the going private companies with above mean shareholding, the cumu-
lative average abnormal return is negative and statistically significant in event 
window [—360, —75] but is positive and statistically significant in event windows 
-250, -75] , [ -200,-75] , [ -75 , -30] , [-30,0], [-10,0], and [+l,+10]. For the 
going private companies with below mean share holding, the cumulative aver-
age abnormal return is negative and statistically significant in event windows 
-360, -75] , [ -250,-75], [ -200,-75] , [ -180,-75] , and [-90, -75] but is posi-
tive and statistically significant in event windows [—75, —30], [—30, 0], [—10,0], 
and [+l,+10:. 
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and median for going private companies. The difference of the cumulative average 
abnormal return in the mean and median is significant at the 1 percent level in 
event windows [ -360, -75] , [-250,-75],卜200,—75], [ -180, -75] , [ -90 , -75 ] , 
and [ -30, 0]. The difference of the mean is statistically significant at the 5 per-
cent level, but the median is statistically insignificant in event window [—75, —30 • 
The difference is statistically insignificant in event windows [—10,0], [—1, +1] and 
+1，+10]. This finding can be explained by the going private premium offered to 
shareholders. Regardless of the shareholding of the offeror prior to the privati-
zation, offerors also offer a going private premium to facilitate the repurchase of 
shares to complete the privatization. In the going private announcement docu-
ments, Hong Kong companies compare their going private premium with that of 
the other companies and show that their offer is generous and that the amount 
of the premium is not lower than that of their counterparts. 
In Table 4.2，the cumulative average abnormal return in above mean share-
holding is larger than that of below mean shareholding. This finding conforms to 
the previously mentioned explanation. As the cost of expropriation is positively 
related to the shareholding proportion of the initiator of the going private pro-
posal, the seriousness of expropriation is negatively related to it. To examine the 
effect of outliers in the shareholding of the initiator, median shareholding and 
50 percent shareholding are selected as other cutoff points in our analysis. The 
results in Tables 4.3, 4.4, 4.5, and 4.6 yield the same intuition of adopting mean 
shareholding as the cutoff point. The cutoff point of the median shareholding is 
the median of the shareholding of the going private initiator, whereas the cutoff 
point of 50 percent shareholding is 50 percent of the shareholding of the going 
private initiator. 
The results of the event study confirm the first hypothesis. The cumulative 
abnormal return experiences a long period of negative return from -360 days to 
t 
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-75 days before the going private announcement. Based on this evidence, we 
propose that tunneling occurs in going private companies in Hong Kong. In the 
increasing portion shown in Figure 4.1, the going private premium offered by 
the initiator of the going private proposal makes the cumulative abnormal return 
increase faster from 0 to 10 days in the event window. In section 4.3，we will try 
to explain the increasing portion before the going private announcement from -75 
to 0 days from the perspective of insider trading. 
4.2 Negative premium 
The preliminary event study results suggest that firms going private first expe-
rience a substantial negative premium, followed by a run-up of stock price three 
months prior to the going private announcement. In this chapter, the following 
questions will be addressed. Which firm characteristic determines the substantial 
negative premium? Do insiders buy the firms' shares before going private? What 
types of firms are more likely to go private? Do bidding corporations benefit from 
the transactions of taking the firm private? In this section, we perform the OLS 
regression of the cumulative abnormal return of going private companies with the 
event window [—250，—75] as the dependent variable. 
In Table 4.7 column (1), the coefficient of the amount of related party transac-
tion {Related party transactions) (—0.1107) is negatively related to the cumulative 
abnormal return. When the total amount of related party transaction over the 
total asset of the company increases by one standard deviation, the cumulative 
abnormal return decreases by 0.652 percent, which is statistically significant at 
the 10 percent level. Investors sell the shares of a company after observing the 
amount of related party transaction. This result justifies the second hypothesis. 
Another variable, Free cash flow scale (winsorize), also has a negative coefficient 
(—0.2681) and is significant at the 10 percent level. When free cash flow increases 
t 
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by one standard deviation, the cumulative abnormal return decreases by 3.544 
percent. This result confirms the third hypothesis. Based on the empirical evi-
dence, free cash flow and related party transaction are negatively related to the 
cumulative abnormal return. Thus, they are signals of expropriation. Although 
other variables are not statistically significant, their coefficients still have a correct 
sign except Number of directors. Proportion of directors，shareholding, Proportion 
ofnon-executive and independent directors and Number of directors represent the 
corporate governance level of the company. Better corporate governance yields 
higher cumulative abnormal return because the expropriation should be less se-
rious. Shareholding of the largest shareholder {Proportion of shareholding of the 
Largest shareholder) is positively related to the cumulative abnormal return be-
cause the seriousness of expropriation directly affects their interests through the 
price of the shares on hand. Amount of asset {ln(Asset)) is a common indicator 
in estimating the size of a company. 
Column (2) includes two more variables, namely, [Market to hook (winsorized) 
and [Debt to market equity (winsorize)]. The coefficient of [Debt to market equity 
(winsorize)] (0.0885) is statistically significant at the 1 percent level. When 
the debt to market equity ratio increases by one unit, the cumulative abnormal 
return increases by 8.85 percent. Higher leverage ratio reduces the seriousness of 
expropriation as free cash flow is used for debt payment. The coefficient of the 
market-to-book ratio [Market-to-book (winsorized)] is statistically insignificant, 
but the negative sign is intuitive. The better prospect of a company allures 
expropriation. The coefficient of Related party transactions and Free cash flow 
scale (winsorize) are still statistically significant. The coefficient of Proportion of 
shareholding of the Largest shareholder (0.6440) is also statistically significant at 
the 5 percent level. 
In column (3), year dummy and industrial dummy are not included in the 
I 
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Independent variables 卜250, - 7 5 ]卜2 5 0 , —75] [—250’ —75]卜250, -75 
W (_^ (¾ � 
Related party transactions -0.1107* —0.1405* —0.1476** -0.1333* 
(0.0589) (0.0739) (0.0639) (0.0752) 
Number of directors -0.0216 -0.0108 0.0200 0.0182 
(0.0225) (0.0196) (0.0170) (0.0249) 
Proportion of directors' shareholding 0.2414 -0.0084 —0.2258 -0.0230 
(0.2668) (0.2148) (0.1833) (0.2510) 
Proportion of non-executive 0.4123 0.3508 0.0225 0.2015 
and independent directors (0.3682) (0.2938) (0.2270) (0.3777) 
Proportion of shareholding 0.5019 0.6440** 0.5367** 0.4284 
of the Largest shareholder (0.3432) (0.2957) (0.2422) (0.3488) 
Audit Committee -0.0553 -0.0273 
(0.2066) (0.1509) 
Free cash flow scale (winsortzed) -0.2681* —0.2751** -0.2059 -0.3559* 
(0.1322) (0.1220) (0.2981) (0.2070) 
Market to book (winsorized) -0.0662 0.0005 0.0102 
(0.0518) (0.0302) (0.0471) 
Deht to market equity (winsorized) 0 . 0 8 8 5 氺 氺 氺 0 . 0 8 8 8 * * * 0 . 0 9 1 3 氺 * 氺 
(0.0153) (0.0193) (0.0222) 
ln(Asset) 0.1168 0.1062 -0.0682 0.0371 
(0.0834) (0.0747) (0.0435) (0.0928) 
ln(Turnover) -0.0460 -0.0462 
(0.0350) (0.0450) 
constant -2.7289** -2.6843** 0.5971 -0.8506 
(1.2112) (1.2230) (0.5408) (1.0255) 
Year Dummy Yes Yes No Yes 
Industry Dummy Yes Yes No Yes 
Number of observations 60 60 50 50 
R-squared 0.5889 0.7477 0.3886 0.6619 
Numbers in the parentheses are robust standard errors 
*,** and *** Significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively 
Table 4.7: OLS regression on average cumulative abnormal return in event win-
dow [-250, -75； 
/ 
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regression, while two more variables, Audit committee and ln(Turnover), are in-
troduced. Their coefficients are not statistically significant. The sign of the 
coefficient of the ln(Turnover) is intuitive. Investors who detect expropriation 
sell their shares making the turnover rate negatively related to the cumulative 
abnormal return. The sign of the coefficient Audit committee is counter intuitive. 
The existence of an audit committee reveals better corporate governance, and 
thus it should increase the cumulative abnormal return rather than reduce it. 
The coefficients of Related party transactions, Proportion of shareholding of the 
Largest shareholder, and Deht to market equity (winsorize) (-0.1476,0.5367 and 
0.0888，respectively) are still statistically significant, but the coefficient of Free 
cash flow scale (winsorize) is not. 
In column (4), year dummy and industry dummy are added to the regres-
sion. In this regression, two important variables for our analysis, Related party 
transactions and Free cash flow scale (winsorize), are statistically significant at 
the 10 percent level Debt to market equity (winsorize) (0.0913) is statistically 
significant at the 1 percent level. 
4.3 Insider trading 
Our preliminary results suggest that there is a pre-announcement price run-up 
before the going private transaction, a possible implication of insider trading. 
The superior information of insiders induces them to buy shares at a low price, 
allowing them to squeeze the minority shareholders. at a lower expense. As a 
result, they can dilute the benefits of the minority shareholders by acquiring 
additional shares at a low price. 
To investigate whether there is insider trading prior to going private, we imple-
ment the methodology of Bhattacharya et al. (2000) and examine the reactions 
of stock prices to going private announcements. The stock price movements are 
I 
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Figure 4.2: Rejection ratio of going private companies with abnormal return 
affected by the news related to the stock. Stocks have an abnormal return when 
there is no information leakage before its announcement. Bhattacharya et aL 
(2000) suggest that the abnormal return is small or there is no abnormal return 
at all if insiders already know the sensitive information on stock prices prior to 
the announcement. When insiders act according to the stock prices' sensitive 
information, the stock prices reflect the information. Although the stock prices 
also respond to the news released publicly, the change in stock prices should be 
small. 
Following Bhattacharya et aL (2000), we calculate the daily abnormal returns 
of each firm in the event period. The normal period is set to 80 days before the 
announcement day to 10 days after the announcement day. The announcement 
event day is from day -1 to day +2. We estimate the abnormal returns for each 
； 
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firm at each day and adopt a two-tailed t-statistics to test whether abnormal 
return on each day is equal to zero. If there is no insider trading, we should 
observe the abnormal return for all firms to be significantly different from zero 
during the announcement period. We introduce rejection ratio for the ease of 
analysis. It is defined as the number of companies with no abnormal return over 
total number of samples. The ratio and the number of companies with abnormal 
return are positively correlated. 
In Figure 4.2, our results suggest that corporate announcement influences 
stock prices because there are more rejections during the [-l,+2] windows. The 
highest observed rejection ratio happens in the [-1,+2] windows. Although the 
evidence suggests that corporate announcements have an impact on stock price 
returns, only 37 percent of the abnormal returns are significantly different from 
zero in the announcement period. Over 60 percent of the companies do not have 
a daily abnormal return in the [ -1 ,+2] period. Insider trading is suspected to 
account for the relatively few significant daily abnormal return when the going 
private announcement is released. 
4.4 The decision to go private 
4.4.1 Sample matching 
To address the reason why firms decide to go private, we need to create a com-
parison group comprised of listed companies only. The methodology applied in 
this article follows Beasley (1996), Lehn and Poulsen (1989), Opler and Titman 
(1993), and Halpern, Kieschnick, and Rotenberg (1999) who match their samples 
intentionally under some criteria. 
Four criteria are required to create a comparison group, namely, stock ex-
change, industry, firm size, and time period. 
1. Stock Exchange. Listed firms selected for comparison are all listed in the 
i 
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Hong Kong Exchange and Clearing Limited, which is the only listing stock 
exchange left in Hong Kong after 1980s. 
2. Industry. All companies are classified into various industries according to 
the industry code assigned by PACAP. Seven classifications are introduced 
by PACAP, but we exclude finance companies and focus on the remaining 
six categories.^ Each privatized sample is matched to a firm with the same 
industry code. 
3. Firm size. A comparison firm is considered a similar firm in size by having 
the value of the total asset within 30 percent of the privatized company's 
total asset one year prior to the announcement date. 
4. Time period. A listed firm is identified as a comparison sample if it fulfils the 
requirements from step one to step four and the fiscal year of the accounting 
data is equivalent to that of privatized firms' preceding announcement date. 
Our identification procedure yields 60 privatized companies and 60 listed com-
panies. There are 61 pairs in total. The following table reveals the matching 
results. 
Table 4.8 shows our matching is successful. The difference in firm size between 
the two groups is not statistically significant with t-value 0.7207. Moreover, the 
distribution of private and public companies in different industry sectors is the 
same. Our matching process yields two groups of companies with similar firm 
size. For each privatized company, the matched public company must be in the 
same industry and at the same fiscal year to make the comparison meaningful. 
^The remaining six categories are Utilities 二 2, Properties = 3, Consolidated Enterprises = 
4, Industrials = 5, Hotels = 6, and Others 二 7. 
5Qut of the 61 privatized stocks, there are actually only 60 companies. Grand Hotel issued 
"A" shares and "B", which are privatized in the same day. Thus, one listed company is selected 
to match with these two shares. 
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Currency: HK(million) Public/listed Privatized/Delisted t-value 
Total assets (million) 
Mean 2393 1978 0.7207 
Medmn 938 859 
Standard deviation 567 433 
Industry 
Utilities 2 2 
Properties 16 16 
Consolidated Enterprises 21 21 
Industrials 25 25 
Hotels 5 5 
Others 2 2 
Stock Exchange HKEx HKEx 
Table 4.8: Matching of public firms and firms going private 
4.4.2 Comparison between going private companies and 
public companies 
This section presents the average value and difference of the explanatory variables 
between going private firms and public firms. 
Among the groups of board characteristics, only the variable Proportion of 
directors，shareholding, Proportion of directors, shareholding�is statistically sig-
nificant in the difference between going private firms and control firms with t-value 
1.9911 and 1.9169, respectively. The director's ownership of going private firms 
is larger than that of control firms. Inferring that the corporate governance of 
the former is poorer than the latter is reasonable because the directors have more 
power in controlling the operation of a company. Free cash flow [Free cash flow 
scale (winsorize)] of going private firms is also higher than that of the control 
firms, and the difference is statistically significant. This phenomenon confirms 
the fourth hypothesis. Companies with higher free cash flow amount are prone to 
experience tunneling. This implies that the largest shareholders may use the free 
j 
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Going 
private control mean 
Variable firms firms difference t-test 
Board characteristics 
Number of directors 9.410 9.9508 -0.5410 -0.9852 
Number of dvrectors.l 9.557 9.4754 0.0820 0.1379 
Proportion of non-executive 0.4967 0.5187 -0.0220 -0.5712 
and independent directors 
Proportion of non-executive 0.4981 0.5093 -0.0112 -0.2970 
and independent directors—1 
Proportion of directors' shareholding 0.3012 0.1921 0.1091 1.9911** 
Proportion of directors' shareholdingJ 0.2997 0.1970 0.1028 1.9169* 
Accounting variables 
Free cashflow scale (w%nsorize) 0.0333 -0.0875 0.1208 2.0932** 
Debt to market equity (winsorize) 1.4127 2.4025 -0.9899 —1.5340 
Market to book (winsorized) 0.9270 0.9988 -0.0718 -0.5889 
Net income over sales (winsorized) 0.0922 -0.0245 0.1167 1.0890 
Turnover 
ln(Turnover) 4.9389 5.8514 -0.9127 —2.8667*** 
*,** and *** Significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively 
Table 4.9: Comparison between going private firms and control firms 
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cash flow to repurchase the shares and utilize firms' internal resources to take 
the corporation private. Aside from the above-mentioned variables, the turnover 
rate [ln{TurnoverJ] of going private firms is lower than that of control firms. This 
result is in accordance with the viewpoint of Mehran and Peristiani (2009), which 
states that private firms go private because of low financial visibility. Consistent 
with the evidence of Mehran and Peristiani (2009)，going private firms are also 
less traded, implying less benefits from the stock market. It also confirms our 
claim that investors sell the stocks of companies being expropriated to avoid loss 
while few investors buy it. As a result, the turnover rate is less than that of 
public companies. 
4.5 Logit regression analysis on going private 
decision 
Table 4.10 shows the logit regression on the decision to go private. Aside from 
finding out the determinants of the decision to go private, we also check if free 
cash flow, which is claimed to be the reason for tunneling, leads to privatization. 
Column (1) includes the variables that describe the board characteristics. As 
the legislation requires all listed companies to set up an audit committee after 
2003, a variable audit03 is used to separate the effect of the existence of an audit 
committee on going private decision before and after 2003. Tunneling is expected 
to happen in companies with relatively poorer corporate governance. Thus, the 
signs of Number of directors, Proportion of non-executive and independent direc-
tors, and Audit committee are correct. Audit committee is statistically significant 
at the 5 percent level. Out of the 60 going private announcements, 35 of them 
are initiated by their parent company. The directors on the board are usually 
assigned by the parent company. Thus, the higher the ownership of the direc-
tors (Proportion of directors, shareholding) comes up with less monitoring of the 
t 
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company, and it facilitates tunneling behaviour, and the chance of going private 
increases. The sign of Proportion of directors，shareholding is correct, and the 
coefficient (1.2316) (the marginal effect is 0.3079) is statistically significant at the 
1 percent level. The coefficient of audit (-1.7533) is statistically significant with 
a correct sign because the audit committee can raise the corporate governance 
level. The marginal effect ofthe audit committee before 2003 is —0.3983，whereas 
the effect after 2003 (0.1490) is significantly lower. 
In column (2), we add two more variables, namely, Free cash flow scale (win-
sorize) and Debt to market equity (winsorize). The board characteristic variables 
do not change signs, and the coefficient of Proportion of directors，sharehold-
ing and audit (1.2755 and -1.4625, respectively) are still statistically significant. 
The marginal effect is 0.3188 for Proportion of directors, shareholding, and the 
marginal effect of audit is -0.3407 before 2003 and 0.1546 after 2003. The sign 
of Free cash flow scale (winsorize) is positive, and the coefficient (1.2086) is sta-
tistically significant at the 10 percent level with marginal effect 0.3021. This 
confirms the fifth hypothesis. The logit regression results show that more free 
cash flow leads to a higher probability of going private. According to Jensen 
(1986), an increase in leverage position can improve corporate governance. The 
negative sign of the coefficient of Debt to market equity (winsorize) shows that a 
higher debt level can reduce the probability of going private. In other words, we 
propose that going private is the result of tunneling, which is aggravated by poor 
corporate governance. Higher debt level improves corporate governance; thus, 
tunneling behaviour is less likely to happen, and the probability of going private 
decreases. 
In column (3), the variables described previously retain the same sign. Pro-
portion of directors, shareholding and Audit committee are still statistically sig-
nificant, but Free cash flow scale (winsorize) is statistically insignificant. The 
/ 
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Independent variables ^ (¾ (¾ � 
Number of directors -0.0461 -0.0681 -0.0892~~~-0.1305 
(0.0615) (0.0634) (0.0717) (0.0946) 
PropoHion of non-executive -0.6203 -0.9570 —1.0229 —0.8475 
and independent directors (0.9003) (0.9228) (0.9525) (1.1059) 
Proportion of 1.2316* 1.2755* 1.4605** 0.9903 
directors'shareholding (0.6307) (0.6552) (0.7075) (0.9631) 
Audit committee —1.7533** —1.4625** —1.4266* 0.0304 
(0.7689) (0.8077) (0.8319) (1.2316) 
audit03 1.0429 0.7618 0.8636 -0.0862 
(0.8496) (0.8854) (0.9135) (1.3984) 
Free cash flow scale (winsorize) 1.2086* 1-4313 2.5861* 
(0.8155) (0.9402) (1.5006) 
Debt to market equity (winsorize) —0.0822 —0.0712 —0.0248 
(0.0570) (0.0555) (0.0530) 
Market to book (winsorized) 0 . 1 3 6 0 0.3323氺氺氺 
(0.1205) (0.1222) 
Net income over sales (winsorized) —0.1640 0.4661 
(0.4384) (0.7775) 




constant 0 . 7 2 1 1 1 . 2 4 7 9 1 . 2 1 7 8 2 . 8 3 4 
(0.8104) (0.8558) (2.3792) (2.7619) 
Number of observations 122 122 122 91 
Log-likelihood value -78.9383 -76.0813 -74.4893 -49.0070 
Pseudo R-squared 0.0665 0.1003 0.1118 0.2175 
Numbers in the parentheses are robust standard errors 
*,** and *** Significance at the 10, 5，and 1 percent levels, respectively 
Table 4.10: Logit regression on going private decision 
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market-to-book ratio [Market to book (winsorized)] is positive because the better 
prospect of a company can generate more resources and assets for expropriation. 
The greater the attractiveness is, the higher the probability of tunneling and the 
company going private. 
In column (4), we add turnover rate [ln(Turnover)] to the logit regression. 
The signs of Number of directors, Proportion of non-executive and independent 
directors, ProporUon of directors ‘ shareholding, Free cash flow scale (winsorize), 
and Market to book (winsorized) remain the same. However, the signs of Audit 
committee, audit03, Net income over sales (wmsorized)，and ln(Asset) change. 
Moreover, Proportion of directors, shareholding and Audit committee are no 
longer statistically significant. The coefficients of Free cash flow scale (winsorize) 
and Market-to-book (winsorized) (2.5861 and 0.3323, respectively) and the newly 
added variable ln(Turnover) (-0.5742) are statistically significant. The nega-
tive sign of the turnover rate confirms that financial visibility is related to the 
probability of the decision to go private. In an unreported result, we calculate 
the marginal effect of the three variables on the probability of going private. 
When the Free cash flow scale (winsonze), Market to book (winsorized), and 
ln(Turnover) increase by one unit, the probability of going private changes by 
0.6374,0.0819 and -0.1415, respectively. 
4.6 The value effect of the bidding firms 
Our results suggest that the going private transaction may be implemented to 
transfer corporate values at the expense of minority shareholders. A more direct 
examination is to test whether going private transaction is beneficial or harmful to 
the bidding corporations. To examine the impact of a going private transaction 
on the bidding firms, we collect the bidding public corporations and perform 
an event study using the date of the going private announcement. In total, we 
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obtain 25 bidding public corporations from our 61 going private cases.® Following 
the standard event-study methodology, we calculate the abnormal returns and 
cumulative abnormal returns over various event window periods. 
Our results suggest that the cumulative average abnormal returns during the 
announcement days are positive and statistically significant in event windows 
_1,+1], [_5,+5], [-10,+10], and [0,+l]. We interpret this positive cumulative 
abnormal return as reflecting the benefits from tunneling reaped by the bidding 
company. Privatizing a listed firm does not seem to gain the benefit of production 
expansion as in mergers and acquisitions. In contrast, keeping a firm listed may 
provide some benefits. Our results suggest that the going private transaction 
benefits bidding corporations. This finding confirms to our sixth hypothesis. 
®A list of bidder companies included in this section is presented in appendix C. 
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Event window mean t-statistics 
( - 1 , + 1 ) 0.0117* 1.5900 
(0.0073) 
( - 2 , + 2 ) 0.0089 0.9362 
(0.0095) 
( - 5 ,+5 ) 0.0136* 1.3278 
(0.0103) 
(-10,+10) 0.280** 2.3940 
(0.0117) 
(0) 0.0075 1.2105 
(0.0062) 
(0,+l) 0.0114** 1.7738 
(0.0064) 
(0，+2) 0.0042 0.5973 
(0.0070) 
(0 ,+5) 0.0012 0.1188 
(0.0103) 
(0,+10) 0.0106 0.9818 
(0.0108) 
Numbers in the parentheses are robust standard errors 
*,** and *** Significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively 
Table 4.11: Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns of the bidders around the 




In this paper, we suggest that tunneling is the cause of firms going private in the 
Hong Kong stock market. Based on our sample of 60 going private companies 
from 1989-2008, our evidence suggests that the relatively higher amount of free 
cash flow of companies than that of other companies in the same industry induces 
tunneling behaviour. Tunneling hurts the interests of investors through related 
party transactions, and thus investors react by selling the shares of the going 
private companies prior to the going private announcement. The investors then 
purchase the shares of the company who benefited from tunneling, which will 
be the initiator of the going private proposal later on, around the going private 
announcement. The cumulative abnormal return of the going private companies 
and the bidder is negative and positive in the event window, respectively. This 
finding indirectly reveals that tunneling occurs between two companies. Our 
empirical analysis justifies our hypothesis because free cash flow and the related 
party transaction amount are statistically significant with the correct sign in the 
OLS regression. Free cash flow increases the probability of going private. The 
amount of related party transaction and free cash flow reduce the cumulative 
abnormal return. 
This thesis has several limitations, such as having insufficient direct evidence 
in the empirical analysis. Aside from the information on related party transac-
49 
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tions, we cannot find other direct evidence to support our theory. More effort 
should also be conducted to discover direct evidence on insider trading. Lastly, 
we need to justify that there are no other factors affecting the cumulative ab-
normal return in our event window. There is still a long way to go in studying 
tunneling and privatization in the Hong Kong stock market. 
To conclude, our paper sheds light on a new determinant in analyzing going 
private transactions in Hong Kong. Although Hong Kong has a mature financial 
market and comprehensive supervision on it, the legal expropriation of minority 
shareholders still prevails. This leaves room for policy makers to improve the 
supervision on financial markets in Hong Kong. 
i 
Appendix A 
Privatized companies included in 
the sample with announcement 
dates 
Going private companies Announcement Date 
ALPHA GENERAL (HOLDINGS) LTD. 20041220 
ASIA ALUMINUM HOLDINGS LTD. 20060316 
B+B ASIA LTD. 19950320 
CABLE & WIRELESS HKT LTD. 20000214 
CAVENDISH INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS LTD. 19910205 
CDW INTERNATIONAL LTD. 19970212 
CHEVALIER CONSTRUCTION HOLDINGS LIMITED. 20031222 
CHEVALIER DEVELOPMENT INTERNATIONAL LTD. 19990914 
CHINA ENTERTAINMENT & LAND INVESTMENTS HLDGS LTD. 19920707 
CHINA NATIONAL AVIATION CO. LTD. 20061116 
CONCORD LAND DEVELOPMENT CO LTD 20010207 
CONSOLIDATED ELECTRIC POWER ASIA LTD. 19961101 
DAIRY FARM INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS LTD. 19940317 
EAST ASIATIC CO. (HONG KONG) LTD., THE 19961016 
EGANA JEWELLERY & PEARLS LTD. 20060710 
ELEC & ELTEK INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS LTD. 20041012 
EVERGO CHINA HOLDINGS LTD 20010807 
EVERGO INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS CO. LTD. 19900731 
FURAMA HOTEL ENTERPRISES LTD. 19970619 
GENERAL ELECTRONICS LTD. 19950929 
GRAND HOTEL HOLDINGS LTD. 'A' 20021025 
GRAND HOTEL HOLDINGS LTD. 'B' 20021025 
HARBIN BREWERY GROUP LTD. 20040504 
HARRIMAN HOLDINGS LTD. 19900730 
HENDERSON CHINA HOLDINGS LTD. 20050620 
HONGKONG LAND HOLDINGS LTD. 19940321 
HSIN CHONG INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS LTD. 19920120 
HUTCHISON GLOBAL COMMUNICATIONS HOLDINGS LTD. 20050503 
IMC HOLDINGS LTD. 20010816 
INDUSTRIAL EQUITY (PACIFIC) LTD. 19910307 
JARDINE INTERNATIONAL MOTOR HOLDINGS LTD. 20000628 
JARDINE MATHESON HOLDINGS LTD. 19940323 
JARDINE STRATEGIC HOLDINGS LTD. 19940324 




LAFE' INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS LTD. 19950921 
LAM SOON FOOD INDUSTRIES LTD. 20020404 
LANE CRAWFORD INTERNATIONAL LTD. 'A' 19990520 
LEI SHING HONG LTD. 20071129 
LI & FUNG LTD. 19881010 
MANDARIN ORIENTAL INTERNATIONAL LTD. 19940322 
MINGLY CORPORATION LTD., THE 20010111 
NEW TOWN (N.T.) PROPERTIES LTD. 19881129 
NEW WORLD TMT LTD. 20051102 
NG FUNG HONG LTD. 20001120 
NOVEL ENTERPRISES LTD. 19941212 
OXFORD PROPERTIES & FINANCE LTD. 20040329 
PACIFIC CONCORD HOLDING LTD. 20030904 
PARK ENTERPRISES LTD. 19910219 
REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION LTD. 'A' 20030124 
RYODEN DEVELOPMENT LTD. 20020910 
SHIMAO INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS LTD. 20070419 
SIME DARBY HONG KONG LTD. 20001124 
SINOPEC BEIJING YANHUA PETROCHEMICAL CO LTD - H SHARES. 20041219 
SINOPEC ZHENHAI REFINING & CHEMICAL CO. LTD. - H SHARES. 20051128 
THE KWONG SANG HONG INTERNATIONAL LTD. 20041213 
TOP GLORY INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS LTD. 20030626 
TVE (HOLDINGS) LTD. 19960314 
WAH KWONG SHIPPING HOLDINGS LTD. 20000607 
WING ON INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS LTD. 20000201 
WINSOR INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION LTD. 20060904 
WINTON HOLDINGS (BERMUDA) LTD. 20021203 




Methodology of event study 
Event study aims to study the effect of an event in the stock price over a period of 
time. In this appendix, a complete procedure is given to conduct an event study 
using the market model approach. This is a statistical approach that relates the 
return of a stock to the return of the market return by OLS regression. 
The sample consists of 60 firms with 61 stocks and contains complete infor-
mation on stock price. The market model approach is adopted to conduct the 
event study. The market model for security i is 
Rit = o^i + PiRmt + Cit) 
(B.1) 
E{eit) = 0, var{eu) = S& 
where Ru is the predicted return, Rmt is the market return, and Ca is the white 
noise error. a“ ft, and 愁 are the parameters of the model. The return of Hang 
Seng Index, which is the most comprehensive market index since 1964, is selected 
as a proxy for the market return {Rmt)- The historical return of a company in 
the estimation window [—610, —361] days before the privatization announcement 
is a proxy of predicted return for estimating the parameters. By applying OLS 
regression, parameters a ,^ /¾, S% are obtained for the next step. 
The abnormal return is defined as the difference between the actual return 
and the predicted return ( ¾ ) . The actual return is the realized stock return 




nouncement. The predicted return (Ru) is inferred from the market return (Hang 
Seng Index) by applying the market approach in the event window. Lastly, the 
cumulative average abnormal return is obtained by summing up the average of 





CHEVALIER INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS LTD. 
CHINA PETROLEUM & CHEMICAL CORPORATION - H SHARES 
CHINA RESOURCES ENTERPRISE, LTD. 
CHINESE ESTATES HOLDINGS LTD. 
COFCO INTERNATIONAL LTD 
GRANDE HOLDINGS LTD., THE 
HANG LUNG PROPERTIES LTD 
HENDERSON LAND DEVELOPMENT CO., LTD. 
JCG HOLDINGS LTD. 
KINGBOARD CHEMICAL HOLDINGS LTD. 
LAI SUN DEVELOPMENT CO., LTD. 
LAM SOON (HONG KONG) LTD. 
LEE HING DEVELOPMENT LTD. 
NEW WORLD DEVELOPMENT CO., LTD. 
SHAW BROTHERS (HONG KONG) LTD. 
SIME DARBY (BERHAD) LTD. 
SUN HUNG KAI PROPERTIES LTD. 
WHEELOCK AND CO., LTD. 




A list of definition of variables 
Related party transactions 
二 The total amount of money involved in the related party transactions over the total asset 
one fiscal year before the going private announcement 
Number of directors 
二 Number of directors in the board of directors 
Proportion of directors, shareholding 
=Director's shares outstanding over the total shares outstanding 
Proportion of non-executive and independent directors 
二 The sum of non-executive and independent directors over the total number of directors 
in the directors' board 
Proportion of shareholding of the largest shareholder 
二 Largest shareholder's shares outstanding over the total shares outstanding 
Audit Committee 
: A dummy variable indicating the existence of an audit committee or not 
audit03 
= A n interacting dummy variable indicating the audit committee of the sample company is 





=Ending Price(Common Stock)xNumber of Shares Outstanding(Common Stock) + 
Ending Price(Preferred Stock)xNumber of Shares Outstand(Preferred Stock) 
Free cash flow scale (winsorized) 
=(Income from operations—income tax+deferred taxation—interest expense—cash dividend) / 
Market Value 
Market to book (winsorized) 
=(Market Value+Total Liabilities) / Total Assets 
Debt to market equity (winsorized) 
=Accounts k Notes Payable / Market Value 
Net income over sales (winsorized) 




=ln(the sum of 12 months trading volume /shares outstanding 
Table D.1: A list of definition of variables 
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